| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w30374
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 30374
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| The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot RCTs |
| John A. List; Rohen Shah
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| 发表日期 | 2022-08-22
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| 出版年 | 2022
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In organizations, teams are ubiquitous. “Weakest Link” and “Best Shot” are incentive schemes that tie a group member’s compensation to the output of their group’s least and most productive member, respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting two pilot RCTs (one in-person, one online), which included more than 250 graduate students in a graduate math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find evidence that such incentive approaches can affect test scores, both in-person and online. |
| 主题 | Econometrics
; Experimental Design
; Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Health, Education, and Welfare
; Education
; Labor Economics
; Labor Compensation
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30374
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/588046
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
John A. List,Rohen Shah. The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot RCTs. 2022.
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文件名：
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w30374.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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