| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30360 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30360 |
| Does the Invisible Hand Efficiently Guide Entry and Exit? Evidence from a Vegetable Market Experiment in India | |
| Abhijit Banerjee; Greg Fischer; Dean Karlan; Matt Lowe; Benjamin N. Roth | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-08-22 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What accounts for the ubiquity of small vendors operating side-by-side in the urban centers of developing countries? Why don’t competitive forces drive some vendors out of the market? We ran an experiment in Kolkata vegetable markets in which we induced (via subsidizing) some vendors to sell additional produce. The vendors earned higher profits, even when excluding the value of the subsidy. Nevertheless, after the subsidies ended vendors largely stopped selling the additional produce. Our results are consistent with collusion and inertial business practices suppressing competition and efficient market exit. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30360 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/588033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Abhijit Banerjee,Greg Fischer,Dean Karlan,et al. Does the Invisible Hand Efficiently Guide Entry and Exit? Evidence from a Vegetable Market Experiment in India. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30360.pdf（655KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
