| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30218 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30218 |
| Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Evidence from the Field | |
| Lucia Del Carpio; Samuel Kapon; Sylvain Chassang | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the context of collecting property taxes from 13432 households in a district of Lima (Peru), we investigate whether prioritized enforcement can improve the effective use of limited enforcement capacity. We randomly assign households to two treatment arms: one replicating the city’s usual collection policy, and one implementing a prioritized enforcement rule in which households are ordered according to a suitable rank and sequentially issued clear short-term promises of collection if they fail to make minimum tax payments. Raw findings show that prioritized enforcement improved tax collection by increasing tax revenue, and decreasing the number of costly collection actions taken. We identify an important friction ignored by existing theory: tax-payers’ response to incentives is slow, which changes the optimal management of collection promises. Finally, we estimate a model of tax-payer behavior and use it to produce counterfactual treatment estimates for other collection policies of interest. In particular, we estimate that, keeping the number of collection actions fixed, prioritized enforcement would increase tax revenue over 5 months by 11.3%. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30218 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587890 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucia Del Carpio,Samuel Kapon,Sylvain Chassang. Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Evidence from the Field. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30218.pdf（2646KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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