| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w30214 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 30214 |
| Political Adverse Selection | |
| Leonardo Bursztyn; Jonathan T. Kolstad; Aakaash Rao; Pietro Tebaldi; Noam Yuchtman | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how the politicization of policies designed to correct market failures can undermine their effectiveness. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was among the most politically divisive expansions of the US government. We examine whether partisanship distorted enrollment and market outcomes in the ACA insurance marketplaces. Controlling for observable characteristics and holding fixed plans and premiums available, Republicans enrolled less than Democrats and independents in ACA marketplace plans. Selection out of the ACA marketplaces was strongest among Republicans with lower expected healthcare costs, generating adverse selection. Computing enrollment and average cost with and without partisan differences, we find that this political adverse selection reduced enrollment by around three million people and raised average costs in the marketplaces, increasing the level of public spending necessary to provide subsidies to low-income enrollees by around $105 per enrollee per year. Lower enrollments and higher costs are concentrated in more Republican areas, potentially contributing to polarized views of the ACA. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Nonprofits |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w30214 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587886 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Bursztyn,Jonathan T. Kolstad,Aakaash Rao,et al. Political Adverse Selection. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w30214.pdf（556KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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