全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Inefficient Automation

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w30154
来源ID	Working Paper 30154
	Inefficient Automation
	Martin Beraja; Nathan Zorzi
发表日期	2022-06-20
出版年	2022
语种	英语
摘要	How should the government respond to automation? We study this question in a heterogeneous agent model that takes worker displacement seriously. We recognize that displaced workers face two frictions in practice: reallocation is slow and borrowing is limited. We first show that these frictions result in inefficient automation. Firms fail to internalize that displaced workers have a limited ability to smooth consumption while they reallocate. We then analyze a second best problem where the government can tax automation but lacks redistributive tools to fully overcome borrowing frictions. The equilibrium is (constrained) inefficient. The government finds it optimal to slow down automation on efficiency grounds, even when it has no preference for redistribution. Using a quantitative version of our model, we find that the optimal speed of automation is considerably lower than at the laissez-faire. The optimal policy improves aggregate efficiency and achieves welfare gains of 4%. Slowing down automation achieves important gains even when the government implements generous social insurance policies.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w30154
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587828
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Martin Beraja,Nathan Zorzi. Inefficient Automation. 2022.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w30154.pdf（714KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览