| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29938 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29938 |
| Independent Regulators and Financial Stability: Evidence from Gubernatorial Campaigns and a Progressive Era Policy Experiment | |
| Marco Del Angel; Gary Richardson | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-18 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. To illuminate the value of this ubiquitous institution, we examine a Progressive Era policy experiment in which hitherto independent regulators came under gubernatorial supervision. After this change, failure rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks under gubernatorial jurisdiction. Declines did not occur during campaigns for other officials or for nationally chartered banks. Declines in bank resolutions during campaigns reduced business bankruptcies. We corroborate these claims with new data and novel IV regressions. Our results indicate that political subservience of financial regulators links electoral and economic cycles. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; History ; Macroeconomic History ; Financial History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29938 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587612 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Del Angel,Gary Richardson. Independent Regulators and Financial Stability: Evidence from Gubernatorial Campaigns and a Progressive Era Policy Experiment. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29938.pdf（515KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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