| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29918 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29918 |
| Are Managers Paid for Market Power? | |
| Renjie Bao; Jan De Loecker; Jan Eeckhout | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-11 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To answer the question whether managers are paid for market power, we propose a theory of executive compensation in an economy where firms have market power, and the market for man- agers is competitive. We identify two distinct channels that contribute to manager pay in the model: market power and firm size. Both increase the profitability of the firm, which makes managers more valuable as it increases their marginal product. Using data on executive compensation from Com- pustat, we quantitatively analyze how market power affects Manager Pay and how it changes over time. We attribute on average 45.8% of Manager Pay to market power, from 38.0% in 1994 to 48.8% in 2019. Over this period, market power accounts for 57.8% of growth. We also find there is a lot of heterogeneity within the distribution of managers. For the top managers, 80.3% of their pay in 2019 is due to market power. Top managers are hired disproportionately by firms with market power, and they get rewarded for it, increasingly so. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29918 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/587591 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Renjie Bao,Jan De Loecker,Jan Eeckhout. Are Managers Paid for Market Power?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29918.pdf（3108KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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