| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29111 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 29111 |
| Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field | |
| Daniel Keniston; Bradley J. Larsen; Shengwu Li; J.J. Prescott; Bernardo S. Silveira; Chuan Yu | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-08-02 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses detailed data on sequential offers from seven vastly different real-world bargaining settings to document a robust pattern: agents favor offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers on the table. Our settings include negotiations for used cars, insurance injury claims, a TV game show, auto rickshaw rides, housing, international trade tariffs, and online retail. We demonstrate that this pattern can arise in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an alternating-offer game with two-sided incomplete information, but this equilibrium is far from unique. We then provide a robust-inference argument to explain why agents may view the two most recent offers as corresponding to the potential surplus. Split-the-difference offers under this weaker, robust inference can then be viewed as fair. We present a number of other patterns in each data setting that point to split-the-difference offers as a strong social norm, whether in high-stakes or low-stakes negotiations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Behavioral Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w29111 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586785 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Keniston,Bradley J. Larsen,Shengwu Li,et al. Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining: Theory and Widespread Evidence from the Field. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w29111.pdf（1455KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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