| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28762 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28762 |
| Adverse Selection in Medicaid: Evidence from Discontinuous Program Rules | |
| Betsy Q. Cliff; Sarah Miller; Jeffrey T. Kullgren; John Z. Ayanian; Richard Hirth | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-05-10 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent expansions of Medicaid eligibility have come with increased experimentation with enrollee cost-sharing. In this paper, we exploit a discontinuous premium increase at the federal poverty level in Michigan’s Medicaid expansion program to test low-income individuals’ sensitivity to premiums using linked enrollment and claims data. At the cutoff, average premiums increase by $3.15 and the probability of disenrollment increases by 2.3 percentage points. Increased disenrollment occurs among those with fewer documented medical needs at baseline, but not among those with greater medical needs. These results suggest healthier low-income individuals may be sensitive to even modest health insurance premiums, and that premiums may induce adverse selection in Medicaid plans. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28762 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586436 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Betsy Q. Cliff,Sarah Miller,Jeffrey T. Kullgren,et al. Adverse Selection in Medicaid: Evidence from Discontinuous Program Rules. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28762.pdf（510KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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