| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28610 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28610 |
| Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt | |
| Andres Gonzalez-Lira; Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28610 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/586283 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andres Gonzalez-Lira,Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28610.pdf（1280KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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