| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28209 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28209 |
| Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting | |
| Francesco Decarolis; Raymond Fisman; Paolo Pinotti; Silvia Vannutelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-14 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on the extent to which it is used for public benefit versus exploited for private gain. We study the relationship between discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption by Italian enforcement authorities. We show that discretionary procedure auctions (those awarded based on negotiated rather than open bidding) are associated with corruption only when conducted with fewer than the formally required number of bidders or employing discretionary criteria (“scoring rule” rather than first price). We further show that, while these “corruptible” discretionary auctions are chosen more often by officials who are themselves investigated for corruption, they are used less often in procurement administrations in which at least one official is investigated for corruption. These findings fit with a framework in which more discretion leads to greater efficiency as well as more opportunities for theft, and a central monitor manages this trade-off by limiting discretion for high-corruption procedures and locales. Additional results based on two standard tools for curbing corruption – turnover and subcontracting limits – corroborate this interpretation. Overall, our results imply that discretion may be under-utilized, given the high potential benefits as compared to the modest increment in corruption. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28209 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585883 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Decarolis,Raymond Fisman,Paolo Pinotti,et al. Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28209.pdf（734KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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