| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w28025 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 28025 |
| Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts | |
| Elliott Ash; W. Bentley MacLeod | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-11-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Anecdotal evidence often points to aging as a cause for reduced work performance. This paper provides empirical evidence on this issue in a context where performance is measurable and there is variation in mandatory retirement policies: U.S. state supreme courts. We find that introducing mandatory retirement reduces the average age of working judges and improves court performance, as measured by output (number of published opinions) and legal impact (number of forward citations to those opinions). Consistent with aging effects as a contributing factor, we find that older judges do about the same amount of work as younger judges, but that work is lower-quality as measured by citations. However, the effect of mandatory retirement on performance is much larger than what would be expected from the change in the age distribution, suggesting that the presence of older judges reduces the performance of younger judges. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w28025 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585698 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elliott Ash,W. Bentley MacLeod. Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w28025.pdf（897KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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