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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w27762
来源IDWorking Paper 27762
What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid
Michael Geruso; Timothy J. Layton; Jacob Wallace
发表日期2020-08-31
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan generates 30% lower spending—driven by differences in quantity—relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing “wasteful” spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision—including the provision of low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government’s contracting problem and program cost growth.
主题Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w27762
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585434
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Michael Geruso,Timothy J. Layton,Jacob Wallace. What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid. 2020.
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