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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w27762 |
来源ID | Working Paper 27762 |
What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid | |
Michael Geruso; Timothy J. Layton; Jacob Wallace | |
发表日期 | 2020-08-31 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan generates 30% lower spending—driven by differences in quantity—relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing “wasteful” spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision—including the provision of low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government’s contracting problem and program cost growth. |
主题 | Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27762 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585434 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Geruso,Timothy J. Layton,Jacob Wallace. What Difference Does a Health Plan Make? Evidence from Random Plan Assignment in Medicaid. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w27762.pdf(1484KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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