| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27624 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27624 |
| Information Frictions and Access to the Paycheck Protection Program | |
| Christopher Neilson; John Eric Humphries; Gabriel Ulyssea | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) extended 669 billion dollars of forgivable loans in an unprecedented effort to support small businesses affected by the COVID-19 crisis. This paper provides evidence that information frictions and the “first-come, first-served” design of the PPP program skewed its resources towards larger firms and may have permanently reduced its effectiveness. Using new daily survey data on small businesses in the U.S., we show that the smallest businesses were less aware of the PPP and less likely to apply. If they did apply, the smallest businesses applied later, faced longer processing times, and were less likely to have their application approved. These frictions may have mattered, as businesses that received aid report fewer layoffs, higher employment, and improved expectations about the future. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Labor Economics ; COVID-19 |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27624 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585296 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Neilson,John Eric Humphries,Gabriel Ulyssea. Information Frictions and Access to the Paycheck Protection Program. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27624.pdf（1147KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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