全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bank Complexity, Governance, and Risk

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w27547
来源ID	Working Paper 27547
	Bank Complexity, Governance, and Risk
	Ricardo Correa; Linda S. Goldberg
发表日期	2020-07-20
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	Bank holding companies (BHCs) can be complex organizations, conducting multiple lines of business through many distinct legal entities and across a range of geographies. While such complexity raises the costs of bank resolution when organizations fail, the effect of complexity on BHCs' broader risk profile is less well understood. Business, organizational, and geographic complexity can engender explicit trade-offs between the agency problems that increase risk and the diversification, liquidity management, and synergy improvements that reduce risk. The outcomes of such trade-offs may depend on bank governance arrangements. We test these conjectures using data on large U.S. BHCs for the 1996-2018 period. Organizational complexity and geographic scope tend to provide diversification gains and reduce idiosyncratic and liquidity risks while also increasing BHCs' exposure to systematic and systemic risks. Regulatory changes focused on organizational complexity have significantly reduced this type of complexity, leading to a decrease in systemic risk and an increase in liquidity risk among BHCs. While bank governance structures have, in some cases, significantly affected the buildup of BHC complexity, better governance arrangements have not moderated the effects of complexity on risk outcomes.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w27547
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585220
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ricardo Correa,Linda S. Goldberg. Bank Complexity, Governance, and Risk. 2020.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w27547.pdf（1655KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览