| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27478 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27478 |
| Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled | |
| Naoki Aizawa; Soojin Kim; Serena Rhee | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the optimal design of social insurance programs for disabled workers by developing and estimating an equilibrium labor search model with screening contracts. In the model, firms may strategically use employment contracts, consisting of wage and job amenities, to screen out the disabled. The optimal structure of disability policies depends on firms' screening incentives, which may distort employment rates and contracts. By exploiting policy changes on the labor demand side for the disabled in the United States, we identify and estimate our equilibrium model to explore the optimal joint design of disability policies, including disability insurance (DI) and subsidies to firms accommodating disabled workers. We find that firm subsidies mitigate screening distortions; at the same time, they interact with DI by reducing the labor supply disincentives it generates. The optimal policy structure leads to a considerable welfare gain by simultaneously making firm subsidies and DI benefits more generous. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27478 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585150 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Naoki Aizawa,Soojin Kim,Serena Rhee. Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Design for the Disabled. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27478.pdf（464KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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