全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w27471
来源ID	Working Paper 27471
	The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity
	Ana Babus; Maryam Farboodi
发表日期	2020-07-06
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We explore a model in which banks strategically hold interconnected and opaque portfolios, despite increasing the likelihood they are subject to financial crises. In our framework, banks choose their degree of exposure to other banks to influence how investors can use their information. In equilibrium banks choose portfolios which are neither fully opaque, nor fully transparent. However, their portfolios are excessively interconnected to obfuscate investor information. Banks can create a degree of opacity that decreases welfare, and makes bank crises more likely. Our model is suggestive about the implications of asset securitization, as well as government bailouts.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w27471
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/585144
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ana Babus,Maryam Farboodi. The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity. 2020.