| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w27005 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 27005 |
| Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition | |
| Eric Barrette; Gautam Gowrisankaran; Robert Town | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | While economic theories indicate that market power by downstream firms can potentially counteract market power upstream, antitrust policy is opaque about whether to incorporate countervailing market power in merger analyses. We use detailed national claims data from the healthcare sector to evaluate whether countervailing insurer power does indeed limit hospitals’ exercise of market power. We estimate willingness-to-pay models to evaluate hospital market power across analysis areas. We find that countervailing market power is important: a typical hospital merger would raise hospital prices 4.3% at the 25th percentile of insurer concentration but only 0.97% at the 75th percentile of insurer concentration. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w27005 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Barrette,Gautam Gowrisankaran,Robert Town. Countervailing Market Power and Hospital Competition. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w27005.pdf（348KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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