| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26925 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26925 |
| Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections | |
| Abhijit Banerjee; Nils T. Enevoldsen; Rohini Pande; Michael Walton | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In 2010, we informed a random set of Delhi councilors, some ineligible for re-election in their current ward, that a newspaper would report on their performance shortly prior to the 2012 city elections. Using slum dwellers' spending preferences, we created a councilor-specific index of pro-poor spending. Treated councilors increased pro-poor spending in high-slum wards. Cross-cutting experiments suggest that the public nature of report cards, not access to information on public services per se, incentivized councilors. Data on party ticket allocation and electoral outcomes shows that, in low-information situations, credible public disclosures of politician achievements matters to both parties and voters. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26925 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584598 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Abhijit Banerjee,Nils T. Enevoldsen,Rohini Pande,et al. Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26925.pdf（882KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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