G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w26903
来源IDWorking Paper 26903
Banking without Deposits: Evidence from Shadow Bank Call Reports
Erica Jiang; Gregor Matvos; Tomasz Piskorski; Amit Seru
发表日期2020-03-30
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Is bank capital structure designed to extract deposit subsidies? We address this question by studying capital structure decisions of shadow banks: intermediaries that provide banking services but are not funded by deposits. We assemble, for the first time, call report data for shadow banks which originate one quarter of all US household debt. We document five facts. (1) Shadow banks use twice as much equity capital as equivalent banks, but are substantially more leveraged than non-financial firms. (2) Leverage across shadow banks is substantially more dispersed than leverage across banks. (3) Like banks, shadow banks finance themselves primarily with short-term debt and originate long-term loans. However, shadow bank debt is provided primarily by informed and concentrated lenders. (4) Shadow bank leverage increases substantially with size, and the capitalization of the largest shadow banks is similar to banks of comparable size. (5) Uninsured leverage, defined as uninsured debt funding to assets, increases with size and average interest rates on uninsured debt decline with size for both banks and shadow banks. Modern shadow bank capital structure choices resemble those of pre-deposit-insurance banks both in the U.S. and Germany, suggesting that the differences in capital structure with modern banks are likely due to banks’ ability to access insured deposits. Our results suggest that banks’ level of capitalization is pinned down by deposit subsidies and capital regulation at the margin, with small banks likely to be largest recipients of deposit subsidies. Models of financial intermediary capital structure then have to simultaneously explain high (uninsured) leverage, which increases with the size of the intermediary, and allow for substantial heterogeneity across capital structures of firms engaged in similar activities. Such models also need to explain high reliance on short-term debt of financial intermediaries.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26903
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584576
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Erica Jiang,Gregor Matvos,Tomasz Piskorski,et al. Banking without Deposits: Evidence from Shadow Bank Call Reports. 2020.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w26903.pdf(1568KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Erica Jiang]的文章
[Gregor Matvos]的文章
[Tomasz Piskorski]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Erica Jiang]的文章
[Gregor Matvos]的文章
[Tomasz Piskorski]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Erica Jiang]的文章
[Gregor Matvos]的文章
[Tomasz Piskorski]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w26903.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。