| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26627 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26627 |
| How Do Employers Use Compensation History?: Evidence From a Field Experiment | |
| Moshe A. Barach; John J. Horton | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants, and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional upon bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Labor Discrimination |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26627 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584301 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Moshe A. Barach,John J. Horton. How Do Employers Use Compensation History?: Evidence From a Field Experiment. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26627.pdf（515KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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