| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26619 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26619 |
| The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives | |
| Lamar Pierce; Alex Rees-Jones; Charlotte Blank | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Behavioral economists have proposed that incentive contracts result in higher productivity when bonuses are "loss framed"—prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We test this claim in a large-scale field experiment. Holding financial incentives fixed, we randomized the pre- or post-payment of sales bonuses at 294 car dealerships. Prepayment was estimated to reduce sales by 5%, generating a revenue loss of $45 million over 4 months. We document, both empirically and theoretically, that negative effects of loss framing can arise due to an increase in incentives for "gaming" behaviors. Based on these claims, we reassess the common wisdom regarding the desirability of loss framing. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26619 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584292 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lamar Pierce,Alex Rees-Jones,Charlotte Blank. The Negative Consequences of Loss-Framed Performance Incentives. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26619.pdf（1124KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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