全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w26604
来源ID	Working Paper 26604
	Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry
	Kyle F. Herkenhoff; Gajendran Raveendranathan
发表日期	2020-01-06
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We measure the distribution of welfare losses from non-competitive behavior in the U.S. credit card industry during the 1970s and 1980s. The early credit card industry was characterized by regional monopolies that excluded competition. Several landmark court cases led the industry to adopt competitive reforms that resulted in greater, but still limited, oligopolistic competition. We measure the distributional consequences of these reforms by developing and estimating a heterogeneous agent, defaultable debt framework with oligopolistic lenders. Welfare gains from greater lender entry in the late 1970s are equivalent to a one-time transfer worth $3,400 (in 2016 dollars) for the bottom decile of earners (roughly 50% of their annual income) versus $900 for the top decile of earners. As the credit market expands, low-income households benefit more since they rely disproportionately on credit to smooth consumption. We find that greater lender entry resulting from these reforms delivers 65% of the potential gains from competitive pricing.
主题	Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w26604
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/584277
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kyle F. Herkenhoff,Gajendran Raveendranathan. Who Bears the Welfare Costs of Monopoly? The Case of the Credit Card Industry. 2020.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w26604.pdf（1176KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览