| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26260 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26260 |
| Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data | |
| Charles I. Jones; Christopher Tonetti | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Data is nonrival: a person’s location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by any number of firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns and implies an important role for market structure and property rights. Who should own data? What restrictions should apply to the use of data? We show that in equilibrium, firms may not adequately respect the privacy of consumers. But nonrivalry leads to other consequences that are less obvious. Because of nonrivalry, there may be large social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard data they own, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Instead, giving the data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data to all interested parties. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26260 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583933 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles I. Jones,Christopher Tonetti. Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26260.pdf（540KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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