| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w26035 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 26035 |
| Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design | |
| Girum Abebe; Marcel Fafchamps; Michael Koelle; Simon Quinn | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-07-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the effect of exposing motivated youth to firm management in practice? To answer this question, we place young professionals for one month in established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. Within the treatment group, we match individuals and firms in batches using a deferred-acceptance algorithm. We show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, but almost no heterogeneity in wage employment. Estimates of marginal treatment effects (MTE) are then used to simulate counterfactual mechanism design. We find that some assignment mechanisms substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the importance of treatment heterogeneity for the design of field experiments and the role of matching algorithms in intervention design. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w26035 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583709 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Girum Abebe,Marcel Fafchamps,Michael Koelle,et al. Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w26035.pdf（1450KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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