| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25949 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25949 |
| Runoff Elections in the Laboratory | |
| Laurent Bouton; Jorge Gallego; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Rebecca Morton | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-17 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study experimentally the properties of the majority runoff system and compare them to the ones of plurality rule, in the setup of a divided majority. Our focus is on Duverger's famous predictions that the plurality rule leads to a higher coordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority runoff rule. Our experiments show that, in contradiction with Duverger's predictions, coordination forces are strong in majority runoff elections. We indeed observe similar levels of coordination under both rules, even when sincere voting is an equilibrium only under majority runoff. Our results suggest that the apparent desire to coordinate, and not vote sincerely, under the majority runoff rule is to some extent not rational. Finally, we find insignificant differences between runoff and plurality systems in terms of both electoral outcomes and welfare. This is so exactly because coordination forces are strong under both rules. But, this does not mean that the two rules are equally socially desirable. Majority runoff rule entails an additional cost: second rounds that take place frequently. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25949 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583623 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Jorge Gallego,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,et al. Runoff Elections in the Laboratory. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25949.pdf（717KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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