| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25917 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25917 |
| Steering in Online Markets: The Role of Platform Incentives and Credibility | |
| Moshe A. Barach; Joseph M. Golden; John J. Horton | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-06-10 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Platform marketplaces can potentially steer buyers to certain sellers by recommending or guaranteeing those sellers. Money-back guarantees—which create a direct financial stake for the platform in seller performance—might be particularly effective at steering, as they align buyer and platform interests in creating a good match. We report the results of an experiment in which a platform marketplace—an online labor market—guaranteed select sellers for treated buyers. The presence of a guarantee strongly steered buyers to these guaranteed sellers, but offering guarantees did not increase sales overall, suggesting financial risk was not determinative for the marginal buyer. This preference for guaranteed sellers was not the result of their lower financial risk, but rather because buyers viewed the platform’s decision to guarantee as informative about relative seller quality. Indeed, a follow-up experiment showed that simply recommending the sellers that the platform would have guaranteed was equally effective at steering buyers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25917 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583591 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Moshe A. Barach,Joseph M. Golden,John J. Horton. Steering in Online Markets: The Role of Platform Incentives and Credibility. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25917.pdf（491KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
