| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25861 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25861 |
| Fiduciary Duty and the Market for Financial Advice | |
| Vivek Bhattacharya; Gaston Illanes; Manisha Padi | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Fiduciary duty aims to solve principal-agent problems, and the United States is in the middle of a protracted debate surrounding the merits of extending it to all financial advisers. Leveraging a transaction-level dataset of deferred annuities and state-level variation in common law fiduciary duty, we find that it raises risk-adjusted returns by 25 bp. Through the lens of a model of entry and advice provision, we argue that this effect can be due to both an increase in compliance costs (a fixed cost channel) and a direct constraint on low-quality advice (an advice channel), and we show how to disentangle these two effects. Model estimates indicate that the advice channel is the dominant force in explaining the observed results, and counterfactual simulations suggest that further increases in the stringency of fiduciary duty, such as a federal fiduciary standard, will continue to improve advice. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25861 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583534 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vivek Bhattacharya,Gaston Illanes,Manisha Padi. Fiduciary Duty and the Market for Financial Advice. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25861.pdf（592KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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