| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25745 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25745 |
| Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs? | |
| Marco Battaglini; Luigi Guiso; Chiara Lacava; Eleonora Patacchini | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-04-15 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To study the role of tax professionals, we merge tax records of 2.5 million taxpayers in Italy with the respective audit files from the tax revenue agency. Our data covers the entire population of sole proprietorship taxpayers in seven regions, followed over seven fiscal years. We first document that tax evasion is systematically correlated with the average evasion of other customers of the same tax professional. We then exploit the unique structure of our dataset to study the channels through which these social spillover effects are generated. Guided by an equilibrium model of tax compliance with tax professionals and auditing, we highlight two mechanisms that may be behind this phenomenon: self-selection of taxpayers who sort themselves into professionals of heterogeneous tolerance for tax evasion; and informational externalities generated by the tax professional activities. We provide evidence supporting the simultaneous presence of both mechanisms. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25745 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583419 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Luigi Guiso,Chiara Lacava,et al. Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs?. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25745.pdf（820KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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