| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w25725
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 25725
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| Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas |
| Charles I. Jones
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| 发表日期 | 2019-04-08
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| 出版年 | 2019
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper considers the taxation of top incomes when the following conditions apply: (i) new ideas drive economic growth, (ii) the reward for creating a successful innovation is a top income, and (iii) innovation cannot be perfectly targeted by a separate research subsidy --- think about the business methods of Walmart, the creation of Uber, or the "idea" of Amazon.com. These conditions lead to a new force affecting the optimal top tax rate: by slowing the creation of the new ideas that drive aggregate GDP, top income taxation reduces everyone's income, not just the income at the top. When the creation of ideas is the ultimate source of economic growth, this force sharply constrains both revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing top tax rates. For example, for extreme parameter values, maximizing the welfare of the middle class requires a negative top tax rate: the higher income that results from the subsidy to innovation more than makes up for the lost redistribution. More generally, the calibrated model suggests that incorporating ideas as a driver of economic growth cuts the optimal top marginal tax rate substantially relative to the basic Saez calculation. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Public Economics
; Taxation
; Development and Growth
; Growth and Productivity
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25725
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583399
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Charles I. Jones. Taxing Top Incomes in a World of Ideas. 2019.
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文件名：
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w25725.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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