| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25510 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25510 |
| Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions | |
| Alessandra Casella; Luis Sanchez | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting are voting systems designed to account for voters’ intensity of preferences. We test their performance in two samples of California residents using data on four initiatives prepared for the 2016 California ballot. We bootstrap the original samples and generate two sets of 10,000 multi-elections simulations. As per design, both systems induce minority victories and result in higher expected welfare relative to majority voting. In our parametrization, quadratic voting induces more minority victories and achieves higher average welfare, but causes more frequent inefficient minority victories. The results are robust to different plausible rules-of-thumb in casting votes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25510 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583184 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Luis Sanchez. Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting. An Experiment on Four California Propositions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25510.pdf（632KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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