| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25258 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25258 |
| Designed to Fail: Effects of the Default Option and Information Complexity on Student Loan Repayment | |
| James C. Cox; Daniel Kreisman; Susan Dynarski | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We ask why so few student loan borrowers enroll in Income Driven Repayment when the majority would benefit from doing so. To do so we run an incentivized laboratory experiment using a facsimile of the government’s Student Loan Exit Counseling website. We test the role information complexity, uncertainty about earnings, and the default option play. We show that despite an ex ante optimal choice, the majority choose, or are defaulted into, a plan that offers no protection against default. We find the default option is a driver of this phenomenon, suggesting the government has an easy policy lever to lower default rates – change the default plan. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25258 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582932 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James C. Cox,Daniel Kreisman,Susan Dynarski. Designed to Fail: Effects of the Default Option and Information Complexity on Student Loan Repayment. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25258.pdf（511KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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