| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25095 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25095 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency | |
| Claudia M. Landeo; Kathryn E. Spier | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the design of enforcement policies to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With an ordered-leniency policy, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. By creating a "race to the courthouse," ordered-leniency policies lead to faster detection and stronger deterrence of illegal activities. The socially-optimal level of deterrence can be obtained at zero cost when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too high. Without leniency for self-reporting, the enforcement cost is strictly positive and there is underdeterrence of harmful activities relative to the first-best level. Hence, ordered-leniency policies are welfare improving. Our findings for environments with groups of injurers complement Kaplow and Shavell's (1994) results for single-injurer environments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25095 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582768 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudia M. Landeo,Kathryn E. Spier. Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25095.pdf（516KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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