| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24831 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24831 |
| Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector | |
| Alan B. Krueger; Orley Ashenfelter | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-16 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we study the role of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing competition for workers. Based on an analysis of 2016 Franchise Disclosure Documents, we find that "no-poaching of workers agreements" are included in a surprising 58 percent of major franchisors' contracts, including McDonald's, Burger King, Jiffy Lube and H&R Block. The implications of these no-poaching agreements for models of oligopsony are also discussed. No-poaching agreements are more common for franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Labor Relations ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24831 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582505 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alan B. Krueger,Orley Ashenfelter. Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24831.pdf（1211KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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