全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of 'Bob the Broker'?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23770
来源ID	Working Paper 23770
	Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of 'Bob the Broker'?
	Aditya Bhave; Eric Budish
发表日期	2017-09-11
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	Economists have long been puzzled by event-ticket underpricing: underpricing both reduces revenue and encourages socially wasteful rent-seeking by ticket brokers. This paper studies the introduction of auctions into this market by Ticketmaster. We first show theoretically that Ticketmaster’s auction design, a novel variant of position auctions, has attractive efficiency, revenue and no-arbitrage properties. Then, by combining primary-market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary-market resale value data from eBay, we show that the auctions “worked” in practice: on average, they eliminated the arbitrage profits associated with underpriced tickets. We conclude by discussing why, nevertheless, the auctions have failed to take off.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23770
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581444
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Aditya Bhave,Eric Budish. Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of 'Bob the Broker'?. 2017.