| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22832 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22832 |
| Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges | |
| Michael Geruso; Timothy J. Layton; Daniel Prinz | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-14 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study insurers’ use of prescription drug formularies to screen consumers in the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges. We begin by showing that Exchange risk adjustment and reinsurance succeed in neutralizing selection incentives for most, but not all, consumer types. A minority of consumers, identifiable by demand for particular classes of prescription drugs, are predictably unprofitable. We then show that contract features relating to these drugs are distorted in a manner consistent with multi-dimensional screening. The empirical findings support a long theoretical literature examining how insurance contracts offered in equilibrium can fail to optimally trade-off risk protection and moral hazard. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22832 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580506 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Geruso,Timothy J. Layton,Daniel Prinz. Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22832.pdf（964KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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