| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22597 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22597 |
| Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Strategic Officers? | |
| Adair Morse; Wei Wang; Serena Wu | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-09-01 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Lawyers now serve as executives in 44% of corporations. Although endowed with gatekeeping responsibilities, executive lawyers face increasing pressure to use time on strategic efforts. In a lawyer fixed effects model, we quantify that lawyers are half as important as CEOs in explaining variances in compliance, monitoring, and business development. In a difference-in-differences model, we find that hiring lawyers into executive positions associates with 50% reduction in compliance breaches and 32% reduction in monitoring breaches. We then ask whether firms’ optimal contracting of lawyers into strategic activities implies less lawyer gatekeeping effort. Using a design comparing executive lawyers hired from law firms to lawyers poached from corporations, we find that lawyers hired with high compensation delta (indicative of the importance of strategic goals in compensation contracts) do less monitoring, preventing 25% fewer breaches than are typically mitigated by having an executive gatekeeper. Reassuringly, lawyers do not compromise compliance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22597 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580271 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adair Morse,Wei Wang,Serena Wu. Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Strategic Officers?. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22597.pdf（362KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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