| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22371 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22371 |
| Moneyball in Medicare | |
| Edward C. Norton; Jun Li; Anup Das; Lena M. Chen | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-27 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | US policymakers place a high priority on tying Medicare payments to the value of care delivered. A critical part of this effort is the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), which rewards or penalizes hospitals based on their quality and episode-based costs of care. Within HVBP, each patient affects hospital performance on a variety of quality and spending measures, and performance translates directly to changes in program points and ultimately dollars. In short, hospital revenue from a patient consists not only of the DRG payment, but also consists of that patient’s marginal future reimbursement. We estimate the magnitude of the marginal future reimbursement for individual patients across each type of quality and performance measure. We describe how those incentives differ across hospitals, including integrated and safety-net hospitals. We find some evidence that hospitals improved their performance over time in the areas where they have the highest marginal incentives to improve care. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22371 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580044 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward C. Norton,Jun Li,Anup Das,et al. Moneyball in Medicare. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22371.pdf（323KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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