| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22293 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22293 |
| Household Risk Management | |
| Adriano A. Rampini; S. Viswanathan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-30 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Households' insurance against shocks to income and asset values (that is, household risk management) is limited, especially for poor households. We argue that a trade-off between intertemporal financing needs and insurance across states explains this basic insurance pattern. In a model with limited enforcement, we show that household risk management is increasing in household net worth and income, incomplete, and precautionary. These results hold in economies with income risk, durable goods and collateral constraints, and durable goods price risk, under quite general conditions and, remarkably, risk aversion is sufficient and prudence is not required. In equilibrium, collateral scarcity lowers the interest rate, reduces insurance, and increases inequality. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Behavioral Economics ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22293 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579966 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adriano A. Rampini,S. Viswanathan. Household Risk Management. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22293.pdf（613KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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