全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Reducing Partisanship in Judicial Elections Can Improve Judge Quality: Evidence from U.S. State Supreme Courts

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w22071
来源ID	Working Paper 22071
	Reducing Partisanship in Judicial Elections Can Improve Judge Quality: Evidence from U.S. State Supreme Courts
	Elliott Ash; W. Bentley MacLeod
发表日期	2016-03-14
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	Should technocratic public officials be selected through politics or by merit? This paper explores how selection procedures influence the quality of selected officials in the context of U.S. state supreme courts for the years 1947-1994. In a unique set of natural experiments, state governments enacted a variety of reforms making judicial elections less partisan and establishing merit-based procedures that delegate selection to experts. We compare post-reform judges to pre-reform judges in their work quality, measured by forward citations to their opinions. In this setting we can hold constant contemporaneous incentives and the portfolio of cases, allowing us to produce causal estimates under an identification assumption of parallel trends in quality by judge starting year. We find that judges selected by nonpartisan processes (nonpartisan elections or technocratic merit commissions) produce higher-quality work than judges selected by partisan elections. These results are consistent with a representative voter model in which better technocrats are selected when the process has less partisan bias or better information regarding candidate ability.
主题	Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Other ; Law and Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w22071
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579744
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Elliott Ash,W. Bentley MacLeod. Reducing Partisanship in Judicial Elections Can Improve Judge Quality: Evidence from U.S. State Supreme Courts. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w22071.pdf（738KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览