| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22053 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22053 |
| Liquidity Requirements, Liquidity Choice and Financial Stability | |
| Douglas W. Diamond; Anil K. Kashyap | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a modification of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which the bank may hold a liquid asset, some depositors see sunspots that could lead them to run, and all depositors have incomplete information about the bank’s ability to survive a run. The incomplete information means that the bank is not automatically incentivized to always hold enough liquid assets to survive runs. Regulation similar to the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio (that are soon be implemented) can change the bank’s incentives so that runs are less likely. Optimal regulation would not mimic these rules. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22053 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579726 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas W. Diamond,Anil K. Kashyap. Liquidity Requirements, Liquidity Choice and Financial Stability. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22053.pdf（779KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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