全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Dynamic Debt Maturity

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w21919
来源ID	Working Paper 21919
	Dynamic Debt Maturity
	Zhiguo He; Konstantin Milbradt
发表日期	2016-01-25
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	A firm chooses its debt maturity structure and default timing dynamically, both without commitment. Via the fraction of newly issued short-term bonds, equity holders control the maturity structure, which affects their endogenous default decision. A shortening equilibrium with accelerated default emerges when cash-flows deteriorate over time so that debt recovery is higher if default occurs earlier. Self-enforcing shortening and lengthening equilibria may co-exist, with the latter possibly Pareto-dominating the former. The inability to commit to issuance policies can worsen the Leland-problem of the inability to commit to a default policy—a self-fulfilling shortening spiral and adverse default policy may arise.
主题	Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w21919
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579594
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhiguo He,Konstantin Milbradt. Dynamic Debt Maturity. 2016.