| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21708 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21708 |
| Work Incentives in the Social Security Disability Benefit Formula | |
| Gopi Shah Goda; John B. Shoven; Sita Slavov | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the connection between taxes paid and benefits accrued under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program on both the intensive and extensive margins. We perform these calculations for stylized workers given the existing benefit structure and disability hazard rates. On the intensive margin, we examine the effect of an additional dollar of earnings on the marginal payroll taxes contributed and future benefits earned. We find that the present discounted value of disability benefits received from an additional dollar of earnings, net of the SSDI payroll tax, generally declines with age, becoming negative around age 40 and reaching almost zero at age 63. On the extensive margin, we determine the effect of working an additional year on the additional payroll taxes and future benefits as a percentage of income. The return to working an additional year at an income level just large enough to earn Social Security credits for the year is large and positive through age 60. However, the return to working an additional full year is substantially smaller and becomes negative at approximately age 57. Thus, older workers face strong incentives to earn enough to obtain creditable coverage through age 60, but they face disincentives for additional earnings. In addition, workers ages 61 and older face work disincentives at any level of earnings. We repeat this analysis for stylized workers at different levels of earnings and find that, while the program transfers resources from high earners to low earners, the workers experience similar patterns in the returns to working. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21708 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579383 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gopi Shah Goda,John B. Shoven,Sita Slavov. Work Incentives in the Social Security Disability Benefit Formula. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
