| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w21541
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21541
|
| Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D. |
| Maria Polyakova
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-09-07
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | I take advantage of regulatory and pricing dynamics in Medicare Part D to empirically explore interactions among adverse selection, switching costs, and regulation. I first document novel evidence of adverse selection and switching costs within Part D using detailed administrative data. I then estimate a contract choice and pricing model in order to quantify the importance of switching costs for risk-sorting, and for policies that may affect risk sorting. I first find that in Part D, switching costs help sustain an adversely-selected equilibrium and are likely to mute the ability of ACA policies to improve risk allocation across contracts, leading to higher premiums for some enrollees. I then estimate that, overall, decreasing the cost of active decision-making in the Part D environment could lead to a substantial gain in consumer surplus of on average $400-$600 per capita, which is around 20%-30% of average annual per capita drug spending. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; National Fiscal Issues
; Health, Education, and Welfare
; Health
; Industrial Organization
; Regulatory Economics
; Industry Studies
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21541
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579216
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Maria Polyakova. Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D.. 2015.
|
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