全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w21302
来源ID	Working Paper 21302
	Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China
	Renfu Luo; Grant Miller; Scott Rozelle; Sean Sylvia; Marcos Vera-Hernández
发表日期	2015-06-29
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
主题	Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Development
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w21302
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578977
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Renfu Luo,Grant Miller,Scott Rozelle,et al. Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOs? School Administrator Incentives for Anemia Reduction in Rural China. 2015.