G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21028
来源IDWorking Paper 21028
The Impact of Consumer Inattention on Insurer Pricing in the Medicare Part D Program
Kate Ho; Joseph Hogan; Fiona Scott Morton
发表日期2015-03-16
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要The Medicare Part D program relies on consumer choice to provide insurers with incentives to offer low-priced, high-quality pharmaceutical insurance plans. We demonstrate that consumers switch plans infrequently and search imperfectly. We estimate a model of consumer plan choice with inattentive consumers and show that high observed premiums are consistent with insurers profiting from consumer inertia. We estimate the reduction in steady state plan premiums if all consumers were attentive. An average consumer could save $1050 over three years; government savings in the same period could amount to $1.3 billion or 1% of the cost of subsidizing the relevant enrollees.
主题Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21028
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578701
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kate Ho,Joseph Hogan,Fiona Scott Morton. The Impact of Consumer Inattention on Insurer Pricing in the Medicare Part D Program. 2015.
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