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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w20337
来源IDWorking Paper 20337
Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data
Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman
发表日期2014-07-24
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent applications. Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications. To test this prediction, we use application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of promotions that carry with them reductions in examination-time allocations. We find evidence demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality.
主题Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20337
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578010
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael D. Frakes,Melissa F. Wasserman. Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data. 2014.
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