| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20309 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20309 |
| Social Structure and Institutional Design: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field | |
| Emily Breza; Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Horacio Larreguy | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In settings with poor formal contract enforcement, profitable investments are likely unrealized. While social closeness can mitigate contractual incompleteness, we examine how to improve the preponderance of cases where contracting parties cannot rely upon social ties. We ask if a community can enlist members to monitor transactions or punish offending parties. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Other ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20309 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577983 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emily Breza,Arun G. Chandrasekhar,Horacio Larreguy. Social Structure and Institutional Design: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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