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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w20048 |
来源ID | Working Paper 20048 |
The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment | |
Hunt Allcott; Richard Sweeney | |
发表日期 | 2014-04-10 |
出版年 | 2014 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. While a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information at more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that at current prices in this context, seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy efficiency investments. We theoretically and empirically explore the novel policy option of combining customer subsidies with government-provided sales incentives. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20048 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577722 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hunt Allcott,Richard Sweeney. The Role of Sales Agents in Information Disclosure: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2014. |
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