| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20021 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20021 |
| How Much Favorable Selection Is Left in Medicare Advantage? | |
| Joseph P. Newhouse; Mary Price; J. Michael McWilliams; John Hsu; Thomas McGuire | |
| 发表日期 | 2014-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 2014 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There are two types of selection models in the health economics literature. One focuses on choice between a fixed set of contracts. Consumers with greater demand for medical care services prefer contracts with more generous reimbursement, resulting in a suboptimal proportion of consumers in such contracts in equilibrium. In extreme cases more generous contracts may disappear (the "death spiral"). In the other model insurers tailor the contracts they offer consumers to attract profitable consumers. An equilibrium may or may not exist in such models, but if it exists it is not first best. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20021 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/577695 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph P. Newhouse,Mary Price,J. Michael McWilliams,et al. How Much Favorable Selection Is Left in Medicare Advantage?. 2014. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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